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intuitionistic | A Wisdom Archive on intuitionistic |  | intuitionistic A selection of articles related to intuitionistic |  |
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| ARTICLES RELATED TO intuitionistic | |
 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - HistoryAlthough the formalisation of logic was much advanced by the work of such figures as Gottlob Frege, Peano, Russell and Dedekind, conventionally the story of modern proof theory is seen as being established by David Hilbert, who initiated what is called Hilbert's program in the Foundations of mathematics. Kurt Gödel's seminal work on proof theory first advanced, then refuted this program: his completeness theorem seemed to bring Hilbert's problem of reducing all mathematics to a finitist formal system, then his incompleteness theorems showed that was unattainable. All of this work was carried out with the pr ...
See also:Proof theory, Proof theory - History, Proof theory - Formal and informal proof, Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculus, Proof theory - Consistency proofs, Proof theory - Structural proof theory, Proof theory - Tableau systems, Proof theory - Ordinal analysis, Proof theory - Substructural logics, Proof theory - Selected bibliography Read more here: » Proof theory: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - History |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Axiom schema of replacement - StatementSuppose P is any predicate in two variables that doesn't use the symbol B. Then in the formal language of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, the axiom schema reads:
or in words:
If, given any set X, there is a unique set Y such that P holds for X and Y, then, given any set A, there is a set B such that, given any set C, C is a member of B if and only if there is a set D such that D is a member of A ...
See also:Axiom schema of replacement, Axiom schema of replacement - Statement, Axiom schema of replacement - Example applications, Axiom schema of replacement - History and philosophy, Axiom schema of replacement - Relation to the axiom schema of specification Read more here: » Axiom schema of replacement: Encyclopedia II - Axiom schema of replacement - Statement |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theoryThe presentation of natural deduction so far has concentrated on the nature of propositions without giving a formal definition of a proof. To formalise the notion of proof, we alter the presentation of hypothetical derivations slightly. We label the antecedents with proof variables (from some countable set V of variables), and decorate the succedent with the actual proof. The antecedents or hypotheses are separated from the succedent by means of a turnstile (⊢). This modification sometimes goes under the name of localised ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Axiom schema of replacement - Example applicationsThe ordinal number ω2 = ω + ω (using the modern definition due to von Neumann) is the first ordinal that cannot be constructed without replacement. The axiom of infinity asserts the existence of the infinite sequence ω = {0, 1 ,2 ,...}, and only this sequence. One would like to define ω2 to be the sequence {ω, ω + 1, ω + 2,...}, but in general classes of ordinals need not be sets (the class of all ordinals is not a set, for example). Replacement allows one to replace each finite number n in ω with the corresponding ω + n< ...
See also:Axiom schema of replacement, Axiom schema of replacement - Statement, Axiom schema of replacement - Example applications, Axiom schema of replacement - History and philosophy, Axiom schema of replacement - Relation to the axiom schema of specification Read more here: » Axiom schema of replacement: Encyclopedia II - Axiom schema of replacement - Example applications |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Structural proof theoryMain article: Structural proof theory
Structural proof theory is the subdiscipline of proof theory that studies proof calculi that support a notion of analytic proof. The notion of analytic proof was introduced by Gentzen for the sequent calculus; there the analytic proofs are those that are cut-free. His natural deduction calculus also supports a notion of analytic proof, as shown by Dag Prawitz; the definition is slightly more complex, we say the analytic proofs are the normal forms, which are related to the notion of normal form in term rewriting. More exotic proof calculi such as Jean-Yves Gira ...
See also:Proof theory, Proof theory - History, Proof theory - Formal and informal proof, Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculus, Proof theory - Consistency proofs, Proof theory - Structural proof theory, Proof theory - Tableau systems, Proof theory - Ordinal analysis, Proof theory - Substructural logics, Proof theory - Selected bibliography Read more here: » Proof theory: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Structural proof theory |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculusThe three most well known proof calculi are:
The Hilbert-style calculi
The natural deduction calculus
The sequent calculus
To say these are proof calculi, rather than proof systems, is to say they are flexible frameworks for the study of many kinds of logical consequence relations. Each of these can formalise propositional or predicate logics of either the classical or intuitionistic flavour, or almost any modal logic studied, many substructural logics, such as relevance logic or lin ...
See also:Proof theory, Proof theory - History, Proof theory - Formal and informal proof, Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculus, Proof theory - Consistency proofs, Proof theory - Structural proof theory, Proof theory - Tableau systems, Proof theory - Ordinal analysis, Proof theory - Substructural logics, Proof theory - Selected bibliography Read more here: » Proof theory: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculus |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal formsA theory is said to be consistent if falsehood is not provable (from no assumptions) and is complete if every theorem is provable using the inference rules of the logic. These are statements about the entire logic, and are usually tied to some notion of a model. However, there are local notions of consistency and completeness that are purely syntactic checks on the inference rules, and require no appeals to models. The first of these is local consistency, also known as local reducibility, which says that any derivation containing an introduc ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivationsA pervasive operation in mathematical logic is reasoning from assumptions. For example, consider the following derivation:
A ∧ (B ∧ C) true
----------------- ∧E2
B ∧ C true
----------- ∧E1
B true
This derivation does not established the truth of B as such; rather, it establishes the following fact:
If A ∧ (B ∧ C) is true then B is true.
In logic, one says "assuming A ∧ (B ∧ C) is true, we show that B is true ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Introduction and eliminationNow we discuss the "A true" judgement. Inference rules that introduce a logical connective in the conclusion are known as introduction rules. To introduce conjunctions, i.e., to conclude "A and B true" for propositions A and B, one requires evidence for "A true" and "B true". As an inference rule:
It must be understood that in such rules the objects are propositions. That is, the above rule is really an ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - First and higher order extensionsThe logic of the earlier section is an example of a single-sorted logic, i.e., a logic with a single kind of object: propositions. Many extensions of this simple framework have been proposed; in this section we will extend it with a second sort of individuals or terms. More precisely, we will add a new kind of judgement, "t is a term" (or "t term") where t is schematic. We shall fix a countable set V of variables, another countable set F of function symbols, an ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Classical and modal logicsFor simplicity, the logics presented so far have been intuitionistic. Classical logic extends intuitionistic logic with an additional axiom or principle of excluded middle:
For any proposition p, the proposition p ∨ ¬ p is true.
This statement is not obviously either an introduction or an elimination; indeed, it involves two distinct connectives. Gentzen's original treatment of excluded middle prescribed one of the following three (equivalent) formulations, which were already present in analogous forms in the systems of Hilbert and Heyt ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Judgements and propositionsA judgement is something that is knowable, that is, an object of knowledge. It is evident if one in fact knows it. Thus "it is raining" is a judgement, which is evident for the one who knows that it is actually raining; in this case one may readily find evidence for the judgement by looking outside the window or stepping out of the house. In mathematical logic however, evidence is often not as directly observable, but rather deduced from more basic evident judgements. The process of deduction is what constitutes a proof; ...
See also:Natural deduction, Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions, Natural deduction - Introduction and elimination, Natural deduction - Hypothetical derivations, Natural deduction - Consistency completeness and normal forms, Natural deduction - First and higher order extensions, Natural deduction - Proofs and type-theory, Natural deduction - Classical and modal logics, Natural deduction - Comparison with other foundational approaches, Natural deduction - Sequent calculus Read more here: » Natural deduction: Encyclopedia II - Natural deduction - Judgements and propositions |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Formal and informal proofHowever, the proofs used in everyday mathematical practice are almost never like the formal proofs in proof theory. They are rather like high-level sketches that would allow an expert to reconstruct a formal proof at least in principle, and given enough time and patience. For most mathematicians, writing a fully formal proof would have all the drawbacks of programming in machine code.
Formal proofs are constructed, with the help of computers, in automated theorem proving. Significantly, these proofs can be checked automatically by com ...
See also:Proof theory, Proof theory - History, Proof theory - Formal and informal proof, Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculus, Proof theory - Consistency proofs, Proof theory - Structural proof theory, Proof theory - Tableau systems, Proof theory - Ordinal analysis, Proof theory - Substructural logics, Proof theory - Selected bibliography Read more here: » Proof theory: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Formal and informal proof |
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 |  |  | intuitionistic: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Consistency proofsMain article: Consistency proof
As we have discussed, the spur for the mathematical investigation of proofs in formal theories was Hilbert's program. The central idea of this program was that if we could give finitary proofs of consistency for all the sophisticated formal theories needed by mathematicians, then we could ground these theories by means of a metamathematical argument, which shows that all of their purely universal assertions (more technically their provable Pi-0-1 sentences) are finitarily true; once so grounded w ...
See also:Proof theory, Proof theory - History, Proof theory - Formal and informal proof, Proof theory - Kinds of proof calculus, Proof theory - Consistency proofs, Proof theory - Structural proof theory, Proof theory - Tableau systems, Proof theory - Ordinal analysis, Proof theory - Substructural logics, Proof theory - Selected bibliography Read more here: » Proof theory: Encyclopedia II - Proof theory - Consistency proofs |
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