Free will - Neurology and psychiatry

Free will is the philosophical doctrine that holds that our choices are ultimately up to ourselves. The phrase "up to ourselves" is vague, and, just like free will itself, admits of a variety of interpretations. Because of this ambiguity, the utility of the concept of free will is questioned by some. Several logically independent questions can be asked about free will. Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism. Determinism holds that each state of affairs is necessitated (determined) by the states of aff ...

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• Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism
• Free will - Moral responsibility
• Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle
• Free will - The science of free will
• Free will - Neurology and psychiatry
• Free will - Determinism and emergent behaviour
• Free will - In theology
• Free will - In Christian thought
• Free will - In Jewish thought

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The theological doctrine of divine foreknowledge is often alleged to be in conflict with free will. After all, if God knows exactly what will happen, right down to every choice one makes, how can one's choices be free? God's already true or timelessly true knowledge about one's choices seems to constrain one's freedom. This problem is related to the Aristotelian problem of the sea-battle: tomorrow there will or will not be a sea-battle. If there will be one, then it was true yesterday that there would be one. Then it would be necessary that ...

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Free will, Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism, Free will - Moral responsibility, Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle, Free will - The science of free will, Free will - Neurology and psychiatry, Free will - Determinism and emergent behaviour, Free will - In theology, Free will - In Christian thought, Free will - In Jewish thought

Read more here: » Free will: Encyclopedia II - Free will - In theology

We generally hold people responsible for their actions, and will say that they deserve praise or blame for what they do. However, many believe moral responsibility to require free will, in other words, the ability to do otherwise. Thus, another important issue is whether we are ever morally responsible, and if so, in what sense. Incompatibilists tend to think that determinism is at odds with moral responsibility. After all, how can one hold someone responsible for an action that could be predicted from the beginning of time? Hard dete ...

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Free will, Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism, Free will - Moral responsibility, Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle, Free will - The science of free will, Free will - Neurology and psychiatry, Free will - Determinism and emergent behaviour, Free will - In theology, Free will - In Christian thought, Free will - In Jewish thought

Read more here: » Free will: Encyclopedia II - Free will - Moral responsibility

Throughout the history of science, attempts have been made to answer the question of free will using scientific principles. Early scientific thought often pictured the universe as deterministic, and some thinkers believed that it was simply a matter of gathering sufficient information to be able to predict future events with perfect accuracy. While not mechanistic in the same sense as classical physics, most current scientific theories are also deterministic, by necessity — it is a basic assumption of all scientific endeavours that the future can be predicted. It is also difficult, if not impossible, ...

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Free will, Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism, Free will - Moral responsibility, Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle, Free will - The science of free will, Free will - Neurology and psychiatry, Free will - Determinism and emergent behaviour, Free will - In theology, Free will - In Christian thought, Free will - In Jewish thought

Read more here: » Free will: Encyclopedia II - Free will - The science of free will

Many claim that, in order for a choice to be free in any sense that matters, it must be true that the agent could have done otherwise. They take this principle — van Inwagen calls it the "principle of alternate possibilities" — to be a necessary condition for freedom. The literary critic Isaiah Berlin made much the same point. The claim is that, for example, if a criminal puts a machine in Bob's brain that makes him kill a stranger, his action was not free, for Bob couldn't have done otherwise. Incompatibilists often appeal to thi ...

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Free will, Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism, Free will - Moral responsibility, Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle, Free will - The science of free will, Free will - Neurology and psychiatry, Free will - Determinism and emergent behaviour, Free will - In theology, Free will - In Christian thought, Free will - In Jewish thought

Read more here: » Free will: Encyclopedia II - Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle

Determinism holds that each state of affairs is necessitated (determined) by the states of affairs that preceded it, an extension of cause and effect. Indeterminism holds this proposition to be incorrect, and that there are events which are not entirely determined by previous states of affairs. The idea of determinism is sometimes illustrated by the story of Laplace's demon, who knows all the facts about the past and present and all the natural laws that govern our world, and us ...

See also:

Free will, Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism, Free will - Moral responsibility, Free will - Compatibilist theories and the could-have-done-otherwise principle, Free will - The science of free will, Free will - Neurology and psychiatry, Free will - Determinism and emergent behaviour, Free will - In theology, Free will - In Christian thought, Free will - In Jewish thought

Read more here: » Free will: Encyclopedia II - Free will - Determinism versus indeterminism