Operation Goodwood: Encyclopedia II - Operation Goodwood - Execution

Operation Goodwood - Execution

Preparatory fire support was provided spectacularly by almost 1,000 heavy and medium bombers dropping over 15,000 bombs. The German positions to the east of Caen were carpet-bombed and many of the villages were reduced to rubble, disrupting the German defenses. The shock value of the intense, short bombardment was high. However, the German artillery on the Bourgebus ridge, Cagny, and Emieville was not hit by any of the air or artillery prep fire. These sites had clear fields of fire into the path of the British advance.

Engineers of the 51st Highland Division cleared 17 one-tank-wide gaps in their minefield in the two nights prior to the attack.

Early advances by the Allied armour were taken under a creeping barrage but were slow, despite encountering little resistance. This was primarily due to the traffic congestion noted above. But by noon the 11th Armored Division's 29th Armored Brigade had gained almost 12,000 yards.

By the time the Caen-Vimont railway was reached the Germans had recovered from the shock of the bombardment. The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry lost twelve tanks at Cagny when 88mm AA guns were turned on them: a single hit on a Sherman was usually sufficient to reduce it to a burning wreck. The Allies slowly pushed through and crossed the railway line to approach the German-held ridge at Bourgebus, where they encountered elements of the 21st Panzer Division, the Panther battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Division, and numerous towed guns. For most of the day, only the 29th Armored Brigade of the 11th Armored Division was attacking. The Infantry brigade was held up clearing two villages behind the tank brigade. Self-propelled artillery did not accompany the tank attack. Finally, the remaining two armored divisions were still negotiating the river crossings and minefield. By dusk only a single tank battalion of the 7th Armored Division was in action; most of the Division did not finish crossing the Orne until 10pm on the 18th and could not add its weight to the attack. Thus the 11th Armored Division was carrying the whole attack by itself most of the day.

The British armor, constrained by the constricted terrain behind the start line, committed the same error that had characterized it in the desert. Individual tank battalions fought unsupported and in succession, rather than fighting together as part of all-arms battlegroups. Unsupported tank units could not easily root out dug-in towed guns, although a combined-arms team of tanks, infantry and self-propelled artillery might have had much better luck. Virtually all the ground gained was won on the morning of the 18th.

The German armour counter-attacked late in the afternoon and fighting continued along the high ground and around Hubert-Folie on the 19th and 20th, by which time any chance of a breakthrough was lost. The British attack, over unfavorable ground, did not have sufficient weight to break through. It is estimated that about 400 tanks were lost, including about half the tanks in the 29th Armored Brigade. Infantry casualties were nearly as high as in previous operations; total casualties were approximately 5,500 British and Canadian soldiers.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Execution", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki