Neville Chamberlain: Encyclopedia II - Neville Chamberlain - European policy

Neville Chamberlain - European policy

Neville Chamberlain, as with many in Europe who had witnessed the horrors of the First World War and its aftermath, was committed to peace at almost any price. Across the political spectrum in the major Western Democracies, there was a sense that war could, and should, be avoided by concession, negotiation and compromise. The theory was that dictatorships arose where peoples had grievances, and that by removing the source of these grievances, the dictatorship would become less aggressive. Chamberlain, as even his political detractors admitted, was an honourable man, raised in the old school of European politics. It was his misfortune, and Britain's, that the imperial rules and aristocratic norms in which he believed were, indeed, anachronistic. His attempts to deal with Nazi Germany through diplomatic channels and to quell any sign of dissent from within, particularly from Churchill, were called by Chamberlain "The general policy of appeasement" (June 7, 1934).

The first crisis of Chamberlain's tenure was over the annexation of Austria. The Nazi Government of Hitler had already been behind the assassination of one Chancellor of Austria, Engelbert Dollfuss, and was pressuring another to surrender. Informed of Germany's objectives, Chamberlain's government decided it was unable to stop events, and acquiesced to what later became known as the Anschluss.

The second crisis came over a section of Czechoslovakia sometimes referred to as the Sudetenland, which was home to a large German minority. The Munich Agreement, engineered by the French and British governments, effectively allowed Adolf Hitler to annex the country's defensive frontier, leaving its industrial and economic core within a day's reach of the Wehrmacht. When Hitler invaded and seized the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Chamberlain felt betrayed by the breaking of the Munich Agreement and decided to take a much harder line against the Nazis, declaring war against Germany upon their invasion of Poland.

The repeated failures of the Baldwin government to deal with rising Nazi power are often laid, historically, on the doorstep of Chamberlain, since he presided over the final collapse of European affairs, resisted acting on military information, lied to the House of Commons about Nazi military strength, shunted out opposition which, correctly, warned of the need to prepare – and above all, failed to use the months profitably to ready for the oncoming conflict. However, it is also true that by the time of his Premiership, dealing with the Nazi Party in Germany was an order of magnitude more difficult. Germany had begun general conscription previously, and had already amassed a formidable U-Boat fleet and air arm. Chamberlain, caught between the bleak finances of the Depression era and his own abhorrence of war – and a Kriegsherr who would not be denied a war – gave ground and entered history as a political goat for what was a more general failure of political will and vision which had begun with the Versailles Treaty in 1919.

My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.

Chamberlain believed passionately in peace for many reasons (most of which are discussed here), thinking it his job as Britain's leader to maintain stability in Europe; like many people in Britain and elsewhere, he thought that the best way to deal with Germany's belligerence was to treat it with kindness and meet its demands. He also believed that the leaders of men are essentially rational beings, and that Hitler must necessarily be rational as well. Most historians believe that Chamberlain, in holding to these views, pursued the policy of appeasement far longer than was justifiable, but it is not exactly clear whether any course could have averted war, and how much better the outcome would have been had armed hostilities begun earlier, given that France, as well, was unwilling to commit its forces, and there were no other effective allies: Italy had joined the Pact of Steel, the USSR had signed a non-aggression pact, and the United States was still officially isolationist.

Chamberlain was nicknamed "Monsieur J'aime Berlin" just before the outbreak of hostilities, and remained hopeful up until Germany's invasion of the Low Countries that a peace treaty to avert a general war could be obtained in return for concessions "that we don't really care about". Again this policy was widely criticised both at the time and since; however, given that the French General Staff was determined not to attack Germany but instead remain on the strategic defensive, what alternatives Chamberlain could have pursued were not clear. Instead, he took the months of the Phony War to complete development of the Spitfire and Hurricane, and to strengthen the RDF or Radar defence grid in England. Both of these priorities would pay crucial dividends in the Battle of Britain.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "European policy", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki