Israeli West Bank barrier: Encyclopedia II - Israeli West Bank barrier - Effects and Consequences

Israeli West Bank barrier - Effects and Consequences

Israeli West Bank barrier - Effects on Israeli Security

Israeli statistics indicate that the barrier has drastically reduced the number of Palestinian infiltrations and suicide bombings and other attacks on civilians in Israel and in Israeli settlements, and Israeli officials assert that completion of the barrier will make it even more effective in stopping these attacks [15] since "An absolute halt in terrorist activities has been noticed in the West Bank areas where the fence has been constructed". [16]

Israeli officers, including the head of the Shin Bet, quoted in the newspaper Maariv, have claimed that in the areas where the barrier was complete, the number of hostile infiltrations has decreased to almost zero. Maariv also stated that Palestinian militants, including a senior member of Islamic Jihad, had confirmed that the barrier made it much harder to conduct attacks inside Israel. Since the completion of the fence in the area of Tulkarem and Qalqiliya in June 2003, there have been no successful attacks from those areas, all attacks have been intercepted or the suicide bombers have detonated prematurely. [1, p56]

During the twelve month period from August 2003 to July 2004 three suicide bombers launched attacks from areas where the fence has been completed which resulted in no deaths or injuries. In contrast during the preceding twelve months, from September 2002 to August 2003, 73 attacks were successfully carried out from these areas, in which 293 Israelis were killed and 1,950 were wounded. The decrease in casualties was not due to a decrease in attempted terrorist attacks; from August 2003 to July 2004 Israeli security forces prevented dozens of planned attacks in the final stages of their implementation and uncovered 24 explosive belts and charges intended to be used for these attacks. From July 2004 to October 2004 only one suicide bombing has resulted in casualties in areas where the barrier has been built. [17]

While there is general agreement that effects to date have coincided with improved Israeli security, the future effects on Israeli security are not known. The Palestinian NGO MIFTA speculates that long-term effects will create more Palestinian hostility towards Israel and that the current security benefits will be "only an illusion": "although the wall may give some immediate relief from the relentless series of terrorist attacks inflicted on the state and people of Israel, building the fence on Palestinian territory will inflame tensions in the region and do nothing to solve the crisis. ... it will give only an illusion of security to the people of Israel in the longer term." [18] On the other hand, Israeli Ambassador to U.S. Daniel Ayalon speculates that the barrier will "save the political process" and lead to long-term security because otherwise "terrorist groups have the ability to hold that process hostage because of their capability to conduct these devastating acts." [19] Lt. Col. Dotan Razili of the Israeli Defense Forces speculates that the long-term effects of a security barrier around the West Bank will be similar to the long-term security effects of the security barrier around Gaza. In an interview on the PBS program The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, he says that "we have experience in other borders... since 1996 if I'm not mistaken, no suicide bombers went out of the Gaza because we have fenced it." [20]

Israeli West Bank barrier - Effects on Demography and Asset Values

According to a 2005 report published by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the barrier being built around Jerusalem may have unintended effects on the city. According to the study, many Jerusalem Palestinians who were living in areas outside the barrier are now moving back into the city, creating housing shortages, increased real estate prices, and sprawling of Palestinians into traditionally Jewish neighborhoods of the city. [21]

Israeli West Bank barrier - Effects on Palestinians

The barrier has many effects on Palestinians including reduced freedoms, decreased checkpoints and closures, loss of land, change in chosen political tactics and strategy, and economic effects.

Reduced Freedoms: in its most recent report, the UN states that:

...it is difficult to overstate the humanitarian impact of the Barrier. The route inside the West Bank severs communities, people’s access to services, livelihoods and religious and cultural amenities. In addition, plans for the Barrier’s exact route and crossing points through it are often not fully revealed until days before construction commences. This has led to considerable anxiety amongst Palestinians about how their future lives will be impacted...The land between the Barrier and the Green Line constitutes some of the most fertile in the West Bank. It is currently the home for 49,400 West Bank Palestinians living in 38 villages and towns [22]

An often-quoted example of the effects of the barrier is the Palestinian town of Qalqilya, a city of around 45,000, where an 8 meter-high concrete section is built on the Green Line between the city and the nearby Trans-Israel Highway, the wall in this section is referred to as a "sniper wall" claimed to prevent gun attacks against Israeli motorists and the Israeli town of Kfar Saba) [23] runs for more than 3 kilometers to the west of the city along the Green Line. The barrier, in the form of a series of razor wires and trenches, also dips beyond the Green Line to encircle Qalqilya from northern and southern sides [24] [25][26]. The city is accessible through a main road from the east, and an underground tunnel built in September 2004 on the south side connects Qalqilya with the adjacent village of Habla which has been cut off by another barrier. Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the government to change the route of the barrier in this area to ease movement of Palestinians between Qalqilya and 5 surrounding villages. In the same ruling, the court rejected the arguments that the fence must be built only on the Green Line. The ruling cited the topography of the terrain, security considerations, and sections 43 and 52 of The Hague Regulations 1907 and Article 53 of the 4th Geneva Convention (see section 16 in [27]) as reasons for this rejection.

In early October 2003, the OC Central Command declared the area between the separation barrier in the northern section of the West Bank (Stage 1) and the Green Line a closed military area for an indefinite period of time. New directives stated that every Palestinian over the age of twelve living in the enclaves created in the closed area have to obtain a “permanent resident permit” from the Civil Administration to enable them to continue to live in their homes. Other residents of the West Bank have to obtain special permits to enter the area.[28]

Decreased Checkpoints and Closures: in June 2004, the Washington Times[29] reported that the reduced need for Israeli military incursions in Jenin have prompted efforts to rebuild damaged streets and buildings and a gradual return to a semblance of normalcy, and in a letter [30] dated October 25, 2004, from the Israeli mission to Kofi Annan, Israel's government pointed out that a number of restrictions east of the barrier have been lifted as a result of the barrier, including a reduction in checkpoints from 71 to 47 and roadblocks from 197 to 111. The Jerusalem Post reports that, for some Palestinians who are Israeli citizens living in the Israeli Arab town of Umm El-Fahm (pop. 42,000) near Jenin, the barrier has "significantly improved their lives" because, on one hand, it prevents would be thieves or terrorists from coming to their town and, on the other hand, has increased the flow of customers from other parts of Israel who would normally have gone to the West Bank, resulting in an economic boon. The report states that the downsides are that the barrier has divided families in half and "damaged Israeli Arabs' solidarity with the Palestinians living on the other side of the Green Line" [31].

A UN report released in August 2005 observed that the existence of the barrier "replaced the need for closures: movement within the northern West Bank, for example, is less restrictive where the Barrier has been constructed. Physical obstacles have also been removed in Ramallah and Jerusalem governorates where the Barrier is under construction." The report notes that more freedom of movement in rural areas may ease Palestinian access to hospitals and schools, but also notes that restrictions on movement between urban population centers have not significantly changed [32].

Loss of Land: parts of the barrier are built on land confiscated from Palestinians. [33] [34]. In a recent report, the UN noted that the most recent barrier route allocates more segments to be built on the Green Line itself compared to previous draft routes of the barrier. [35]

As of May 2004, the fence construction had already uprooted an estimated 102,320 Palestinian olive and citrus trees, demolished 75 acres (0.3 km²) of greenhouses and 23 miles (37 km) of irrigation pipes. At that point, it rested on 15,000 dunums (3,705 acres or 15 km²) of confiscated land, only meters away from a number of small villages, or hamlets. In early 2003, in order to move a section of the barrier to the Green Line, a ramshackle mall of 63 shops was demolished by the IDF in the village of Nazlat Issa [36][37][38]. In August of that year, an additional 115 shops/stalls (an important source of income for several communities) and five to seven homes were also demolished there [39][40]. The United Nations has established a registry to register claims of property damage caused by the separation barrier. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, said, "...we are establishing that register to be able in time to help those with claims." [41] The Israeli Government has promised that trees affected by the construction will be replanted [42]. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 15 communities were to be directly affected, numbering approximately 138,593 Palestinians, including 13,450 refugee families, or 67,250 individuals. In addition to loss of land, in the city of Qalqilya one-third of the city's water wells lie on the other side of the barrier. The Israeli Supreme Court notes the Israeli government's rejection of accusations of a de facto annexation of these wells, stating that "the construction of the fence does not affect the implementation of the water agreements determined in the (interim) agreement" (Section 67d).

Change In Chosen Political Tactics and Strategy: Members of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have been unable to conduct terrorist attacks, the numbers of which have decreased in areas where the barrier has been completed. [43] [44] Subsequently, these Palestinian organizations have sometimes chosen different political tactics and strategy. For instance, it has been suggested that the participation of Hamas in the electoral process is a result of their reduced ability to conduct terrorist attacks. [45]

Economic Effects: GDP in the West Bank declined significantly from $3.3 billion in 1999 [46] to $1.7 billion in 2002 [47]. In 2005, the PNA Ministry of Finance attributed one cause of the low economic activity to "the construction of the separation wall" [48] which was begun in the second half of 2002. While real GDP growth in the West Bank declined annually by 7.5%, 35.0%, and 22.0%, respectively, in 2000, 2001, and 2002, it increased annually by 6.0% and 6.2%, respectively, in 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 1) when significant portions of the barrier were completed. The World Bank attributes the modest economic growth since 2003 to "diminished levels of violence, fewer curfews, and more predictable (albeit still intense) closures, as well as adaptation by Palestinian business to the contours of a constrained West Bank economy". Under a "disengagement scenario" the Bank predicts a real growth rate of -0.2% in 2006 and -0.6% in 2007. (The World Bank Group West Bank and Gaza Update, November 2005, p. 9)

According to the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) and other sources, 45% of Qalqilya's farmland [49][50] now lie outside the barrier, and farmers require permits from Israeli authorities to access their lands that are on the opposite side. There are three gates in the barrier for the purpose of admitting farmers with permits to their fields that are open 3 times a day for a total of 50 minutes [51], although according to the NAD they have often been arbitrarily closed for extended periods leading to loss of crops, and one of these gates has been closed since August 2004 due to a suicide attack that took place near the gate. The Israeli Human Rights center B'Tselem notes that "thousands of Palestinians have difficulty going to their fields and marketing their produce in other areas of the West Bank . Farming is a primary source of income in the Palestinian communities situated along the Barrier's route, an area that constitutes one of the most fertile areas in the West Bank . The harm to the farming sector is liable to have drastic economic effects on the residents – whose economic situation is already very difficult – and drive many families into poverty." [52]

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Effects and Consequences", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki