Gnosticism: Encyclopedia II - Gnosticism - Etymology and philosophical context

Gnosticism - Etymology and philosophical context

Gnosticism - The meaning of 'gnosis'

The word gnosticism is a modern construction, though based on an antiquated linguistic expression; it comes from the Greek word meaning 'knowledge', gnosis (γνώσις). However, gnosis itself refers to a very specialised form of knowledge, deriving both from the exact meaning of the original Greek term and its usage in Platonist philosophy.

Unlike modern English, ancient Greek was capable of discerning between several different forms of knowing. These different forms may be described in English as being "propositional knowledge", as being indicative of knowledge acquired indirectly through the reports of others or otherwise by inference (such as "I know of Wikipedia" or "I know Berlin is in Germany"), and knowledge acquired by direct participation or acquaintance (such as "I know Wikipedia well" or "I know Berlin, having visited").

Gnosis (γνώσις) refers to knowledge of the second kind. Therefore, in a religious context, to be 'gnostic' should be understood as being reliant not on knowledge in a general sense, but as being specially receptive to mystical or esoteric experiences of direct participation with the the divine. Indeed, in most gnostic systems the sufficient cause of salvation is this 'knowledge of' ('acquaintance with') the divine. This is commonly identified with a process of inward 'knowing' or self-exploration, comparable to that encouraged by Plotinus (ca. 205–270 CE). However, as may be seen, the term 'gnostic' also had precedent usage in several ancient philosophical traditions, which must also be weighed in considering the very subtle implications of its appellation to a set of ancient religious groups.

Gnosticism - The Platonist and Aristotelian traditions

The first usage of the term ‘gnostikoi’, that is, 'those capable of knowing', was by Plato in the Politicus (258e-267a), in which he compares the gnostike episteme ('understanding connected with knowledge') which denotes knowledge based on mathematical understanding, to the praktike episteme ('understanding connected with practice'). He describes the ideal politician as the practitioner par excellence of the former, and his success is to be considered only in the light of his ability toward this ‘art of knowing’, irrespective of social rank. Hence any man, be he ruler or otherwise may thus become, as Plato puts it, ‘royal’. Here, gnostikos makes reference to an ability to possess certain knowledge, not the condition of possessing knowledge per se or the knowledge that is itself possessed, nor even, it might be further noted, to the individual who possesses it.

In ‘The History of the Term Gnostikos’ in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981, 798-800) Morton Smith lists users of ‘gnostikos’ in this manner as being Aristotle, Strato of Lapsacus, ‘a series of Pythagoreans"’, Philo Judaeus and Plutarch, amongst others. Christoph Markschies notes in Gnosis: An Introduction (trans. John Bowden, T & T Clark, London, 2001) that the term was used extensively only within the Platonist tradition, and would not have had much relevence outside it.

Despite this, Plato's usage of the descriptive phrase 'royal' to denote the elevated position of the able gnostikoi, and the availibility of such a position to all members of society regardless of rank, would have been greatly appealing to such early Christians as Clement (Titus Flavius Clementis) of Alexandria, who happily described gnosis as the central goal of Christian faith. Despite this, Clement is not typically considered a gnostic in the modern sense. It is worth noting that this lack of cohesion between understandings of such terms contemporary to gnosticism's greatest flourishings and modern understandings as shown through usage can sometimes lead to misunderstandings concerning gnosticism's true nature and development and, as in the case of Plotinus, the identity of its opponents.

Of course, several ancient traditions of 'knowing' existed outside the Platonist tradition: Aristotle described the ideal life of success as being the one which is spent in theoretical contemplation (bios theoretikos). Thus, as with Clement, gnosis as such becomes the central goal of life, extending through the mode of morality into the realms of politics and religion. Philosophy, according to Aristotle, is a methodically ordered form of attaining this gnosis: 'Philosophy promises knowledge of being' (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ca. 200 CE).

Gnosticism, therefore, is but one of many ancient traditions which are dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, and which supply disciplinary systems that are supposed to aid in such a pursuit. As with both the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions, the pursuit of gnosis is the central occupation of life, and involves a measure of dedicated contemplation to attain. As with Clement, it may be surmised that the description of the gnostike episteme by Plato was appealing to early gnostic formulators; however, early gnostic groups typically do not depict Plato's capacity for knowing as being extended to all mankind, but restrict it to a select group. This is especially true in the Sethian gnostic tradition (see below).

Despite the above, the problem remains that the term 'gnosticism' was rarely if ever self-applied by any group in antiquity; even if the suitability of the term might be argued from the discussion above, it remains for the most part a modern typographical construction. As a result, the term may be said to draw attention to the doctrine of gnosis out of proportion to its actual importance to 'gnostics' themselves. On the other hand, 'gnosticism' is still adjectivally applied to systems of belief which do not afford knowledge the special significance that is the foundation of the term, but which merely relate to those that do by dint of other similarities, such as structural parallels. This tactic could be said to stretch the category's usefulness in meaningful discussion. In certain cases, scholars have been led to erroneously assume an exact correspondence of meaning between the ancient and modern usages of the term, as may be seen in the example of Plotinus' famous address in The Enneads.

Gnosticism - Neoplatonism and Plotinus' 'Address to the Gnostics'

The text which has come to be known as Plotinus' 'Address to the Gnostics' or 'Against the Gnostics' is more properly known as 'Against those that affirm the creator of the kosmos and the kosmos itself to be evil'. The text appears in the ninth tractate of the second Ennead, the works of Plotinus as collated and edited by Porphyry, his disciple. It is known that Plotinus' writing was poor, and that he detested revising and correcting his work, preferring to leave that to others such as Porphyry. Thus the correct title is not one of Plotinus' devising, but is one of Porphyry's emendations to the text.

The formation of the text is as an address against a gnostic sect as delivered by Plotinus to a number of his students, who had been corrupted by the former's ideas. As such, the tract takes the form of an extended address by Plotinus, and he occasionally acknowledges the audience as intimates.

The general tendency to view the text much as its titles - both modern abbreviations and Porphyry's original - advertize it have recently come under challenge, as to do so makes several assumptions. Doubts concerning the accuracy of modern titles in reflecting the text's central intentions might arise, especially when it is considered that the word 'gnostic' occurs very seldom in the tractate itself. For example, in A.H. Armstrong's translation of The Enneads, 'gnostic' occurs only 11 times in the tractate in question, often as editorial emendations for neutral phrases such as 'they' (αύτούς) or 'the others' (των αλων). Thus, it is only through a historical assumption that Porphyry's description of the title becomes directed against any gnostic sect.

Questions may also arise concerning Porphyry's own title. Morton Smith has hypothesized that Porphyry was influenced by the success of Irenaeus' Adversus Haereses, which was well known in Rome at the time; Porphyry thus appropriated the form of the title to describe a schismatic group, though recalling the discussion above, it would be likely that Porphyry would understand 'gnostic' in a Platonist context, rather than a Christian one. In any case, it is less and less certain that Plotinus was addressing a group recognizable as gnostic by modern standards, and more likely that an alternative target is intended. The description of his opponent's libertinism, for example, do not sit well with the overwhelming evidence of gnosticism being a predominantly ascetic tradition (see below).

It may be noted that several of Plotinus' criticisms of his opponents are as applicable to orthodox Christianity as they are to gnosticism; for example, several of the ideas criticized by Plotinus may be discerned in the theoretic of Clement of Alexandria (whom, it might be remembered, referred to Christian faith in general as 'gnostic' in his Stromateis, VII.xli). Previously, this has been taken as a matter of coincidence, inevitable given the close relationship of the traditions in question. Yet with the calling into doubt of the intended recipients of the tractate, and the gradual recognition of the essential fluidity of the boundaries between early orthodoxy and gnosticism, this too has been brought into question.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Etymology and philosophical context", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki