Cuban Missile Crisis: Encyclopedia II - Cuban Missile Crisis - Prelude

Cuban Missile Crisis - Prelude

Cuban Missile Crisis - The Cuban Revolution

The revolution in Cuba was the second time a country had become communist without significant military or political intervention from the USSR, China being the first. As such, it was hugely symbolic to Soviet leaders - particularly Nikita Khrushchev. The Soviet leader regarded the defense of the communist island as critical to the international standing of the USSR and of communist ideology.

It is likely that Khrushchev believed that deployment of missiles in Cuba would protect the island from a second American invasion that he regarded as inevitable following the Bay of Pigs Invasion debacle of 1961. A significant military deployment of highly-prized weapons would also demonstrate the importance of the Soviet-Cuban alliance to Castro, who had requested physical evidence of Soviet support for the island.

Cuban Missile Crisis - U.S. missile sites in Turkey

In 1961, the U.S. started deploying 15 Jupiter IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) nuclear missiles near Izmir, Turkey, which directly threatened cities in the western sections of the Soviet Union. These missiles were regarded by President John F. Kennedy as being of questionable strategic value; a nuclear submarine was capable of providing the same cover with both stealth and superior firepower. In the late 1950's missile technology was well developed in the field of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), as opposed to ICBMs which could not be kept in a state of readiness at all times.

MRBMs represented only a small portion of the total American nuclear arsenal, but still much larger than the U.S.S.R.'s. Soviet strategists realized that some nuclear equality could be efficiently reached by placing missiles in Cuba. Soviet MRBMs on Cuban soil, with a range of 2,000 km (1,200 statute miles), could threaten Washington, DC and around half of the U.S. SAC bases (of nuclear-armed bombers), with a flight time of under twenty minutes. In addition, the U.S.'s radar warning systems oriented toward USSR would have provided little warning of a launch from Cuba.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had publicly expressed his anger at the Turkish deployment, and regarded the missiles as a personal affront. The deployment of missiles in Cuba - the first time Soviet missiles were moved outside the USSR - is commonly seen as Khrushchev's direct response to the Turkish missiles.

Cuban Missile Crisis - Missile Deployment

Khrushchev devised the deployment plan in May of 1962, and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en-route to Cuba, some of them already carrying military material. John McCone, director of the CIA, warned President Kennedy that some of the ships were probably carrying missiles; however, a meeting with John and Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk, and Robert McNamara decided that the Soviets would not try such a thing. Kennedy's administration had received repeated claims from Soviet diplomats that there were no missiles in Cuba, nor any plans to place any, and that the Soviets were not interested in starting an international drama that might impact the US elections in November.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Prelude", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki