Spanish transition to democracy: Encyclopedia II - Spanish transition to democracy - The First Government of Adolfo Suárez July 1976 - June 1977

Spanish transition to democracy - The First Government of Adolfo Suárez July 1976 - June 1977

Fernández Miranda, as president of the Council of the Kingdom, obtained Adolfo Suárez’s placement on the new list of three candidates for head of the government. The king chose Suárez because he met all the criteria to achieve the difficult political operation that lay ahead: convincing the Cortes, composed of installed, Francoist politicians to dismantle Franco’s system. In this manner he would formally act within the Francoist legal system and skirt, if possible, the danger of military intervention in the process of transition.

Adolfo Suárez quickly presented a clear political program based on two points:

• The development of a Law for Political Reform that, once approved by the Cortes and the Spanish public in a referendum, would open the constituent process for creating a liberal democracy in Spain.

• A call for democratic elections in June, 1977 in order to elect a Cortes that would be charged with drawing up a new democratic constitution.

This program was clear and unequivocal, but its realization was very difficult and tested the political capacity of Suárez. He had to convince the opposition to participate in his plan and the army to allow the process to run uninterrupted, and to control the situation in the Basque Country, which had been out of control for days.

Despite all these difficulties, Suárez's project went under way without delay between July 1976 and June 1977. In this short period of time Adolfo Suárez had to act on many fronts to achieve his reform project.

Spanish transition to democracy - The Law for Political Reform

The project of the Law for Political Reform (Ley para la Reforma Política) was developed by the Suárez government in September 1976. In order to open the door to parliamentary democracy in Spain, this legislation could not simply create a new political system by eliminating the obstacles put in place by the Franco regimen against democracy: it had to liquidate the Francoist system through the Francoist Cortes themselves. Throughout the month of November the Cortes, under the able presidency of Fernández Miranda, debated this law, which it ultimately approved with 425 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions.

The Suárez government wanted to gain further legitimacy for the changes through a popular referendum. With a 77.72% participation rate, 94% of the voters voted in favor of the changes.

From this moment, it was possible to begin the electoral process, the second part of the Suárez program, which would serve to elect the deputies of the Constituent Cortes, responsible for creating a democratic constitution.

With this the second part of his plan accomplished, Suárez had to resolve a crucial problem: should he include the opposition groups who had not participated in the beginnings of the transition? To resolve this problem, Suárez had to tackle another delicate issue, the agreements with the anti-Francoist opposition.

Spanish transition to democracy - Relations of the Suárez Government with the Opposition

Suárez adopted a series of measured policies to add credibility to his project. In July 1976 he issued a partial political amnesty, freeing 400 prisoners. He extended this in March 1977, and finally granted a blanket amnesty in May of the same year. In December, 1976 the Tribunal de Orden Público (TOP), a sort of Francoist secret police, was dissolved. In March 1977, the right to strike was legalized. In April of the same year the right to unionize was granted. Also, in March 1977 a new electoral Law (Ley Electoral) fulfilled the necessary conditions needed for Spain's electoral system to be brought into accord with those of other countries that had liberal, parliamentary democracies.

Through these and other measures of government, Suárez complied with the conditions that the opposition groups had demanded since 1974. These opposition forces had met in November 1976 in order to create a platform of democratic organizations.

Suárez had initiated political contact with the opposition by meeting with Felipe González, secretary general of the PSOE, in August 1976. The positive attitude of the socialist leader gave wings to Suárez to carry forward his political project, but everyone clearly perceived that the big problem for the political normalization of the county would be the legalization of the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España or PCE), which had, at the time, more activists and was more organized than any other group in the political opposition. However, in a meeting Suárez had with the most important military leaders (September, 1976), the officers clearly declared their full opposition against the legalization of the PCE.

The PCE, for its part, acted ever more publicly to express its opinions. According to the Communists, the Law for Political Reform was anti-democratic, and, moreover, the elections for the Constituent Cortes should be called by a provisional government that formed part of the political forces of the opposition. The opposition did not show any enthusiasm for the Law for Political Reform. Suárez had to risk even more in order to involve the opposition forces in his plan.

In December 1976, the PSOE celebrated its XXVII Congress in Madrid, and began to disassociate itself from the demands of the PCE, affirming that it would participate in the next call for elections for the Constituent Cortes. In the beginning of 1977, the year of the elections, Suárez decided to confront the problem of legalizing the PCE. In February of the same year, convinced that the process of political normalization would not be viable if the PCE was marginalized, he talked with PCE secretary Santiago Carrillo. Carrillo's willingness to collaborate without prior demands and his offer of a "social pact" for the period after the elections pushed Suárez to take the riskiest step of the transition: the legalization of the PCE in April 1977.

Spanish transition to democracy - Relations of the Suárez government with the army

Adolfo Suárez knew full well that the "Búnker"—a group of hard-line Francoists led by José Antonio Girón and Blas Piñar, who had a mouthpiece in the newspaper El Alcázar—had close contacts with officials in the army and exercised influence over important sectors of the military. These forces could constitute an insurmountable obstacle if they obtained military intervention against political reform.

To resolve this difficulty, Suárez intended to support himself with a liberal group within the military, centered on General Díez Alegría. Suárez decided to give the members of this group the positions of authority with the most responsibility. The most notable personality of this tendency within the army was General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado. But in July 1976, the Vice President for Defense Affairs was General Fernando de Santiago who belonged to the hardline group within the army. De Santiago had shown his restlessness before, during the first amnesty in July 1976. He had opposed the law granting the right to unionize. Suárez dismissed Fernando de Santiago and nominated instead Gutiérrez Mellado. This confrontation with General de Santiago caused a large part of the army to oppose Suárez, an opposition that further intensified when the PCE was legalized.

Meanwhile, Gutiérrez Mellado promoted officials who supported political reform removed those commanders of security forces (Policía Armada and the Guardia Civil) who seemed to support preserving the Francoist regime.

Suárez wanted to demonstrate to the army that the political normalization of the country meant neither anarchy nor revolution. In this, he counted on the collaboration of Santiago Carrillo, but he could in no way count on the collaboration of terrorist groups.

Spanish transition to democracy - Terrorism revives itself

The Basque Country remained, for the better part of this period, in a state of political turbulence. Suárez granted a multi-stage amnesty, but the confrontations continued between police and protesters. ETA, which in the summer of 1976 seemed open to a limited truce, resumed terror tactics again in October; 1978–1980 would be ETA's three deadliest years ever. [1] But it was between December 1976 and January 1977 when a series of terror attacks brought about a situation of strong tension in Spain.

First, the left-wing GRAPO (Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre) began by placing bombs and continued with the kidnapping of two important figures of the regime: the President of the Council of the State José María de Oriol, and general Villaescusa, President of the Superior Council of the Military Justice. From the right, during these kidnappings, a group of fascists murdered six members of the PCE, five of them labor lawyers, in an office on Atocha Street in Madrid.

In the midst of these dramatic provocations, Suárez convened his first meeting with any significant number of opposition leaders, who published a condemnation of terrorism and gave their support to Suárez's actions. The forces of the Búnker benefited during this restless time, and announced that the country was on the brink of chaos.

In spite of all these difficulties, elections for the Constituent Cortes took place in June 1977.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "The First Government of Adolfo Suárez July 1976 - June 1977", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki