Iraqi insurgency: Encyclopedia II - Iraqi insurgency - Composition

Iraqi insurgency - Composition

The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine. It is often divided by analysts into several main ideological strands, some of which are believed to overlap:

• Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein;
• Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement;
• Foreign Islamist fighters including al Qaeda, largely driven by the similar Sunni Wahabi doctrine, as well as the remnants of Ansar al-Islam;
• Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims, who fight for Iraqi independence;
• Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the power they held under previous regimes;
• Patriotic Communists (who have split from the official Iraqi Communist Party) and other leftists.
• Criminal insurgents who are fighting simply for money; and
• Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties (not technically part of the insurgency).

The Militant followers of Shi'a Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, once active members in the insurgency, appear to be no longer taking part in the fighting.

Iraqi insurgency - Ba'athists

The Ba'athists include former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam insurgency after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power. Following Saddam's capture, the rhetoric of the Ba'athist insurgents gradually shifted to become either nationalist or Islamist, with the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power as it once was seemingly out of reach. Many former Ba'athists have adopted an Islamist façade in order to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in politics.

Many Ba'athist organizations, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, have a violent past. Saddam used this particular group as a way to silence his political opponents into submission through fear. One such terror campaign involved members of the Fedayeen Saddam systematically beheading female family members of opponents of his regime.

Iraqi insurgency - Sunni Muslims

Nationalists from the Sunni Arab regions are drawn from former members of the Iraqi military as well as other Sunnis. Their reasons for opposing the coalition vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty. Some Iraqis who have had relatives killed by coalition soldiers may also be involved in the insurgency. Most likely, the majority of the low-level members of the indigenous Sunni insurgency (such as foot soldiers) fall under this broad category.

Some of these insurgents pursue the restoration of the power previously held by the Sunni minority in Iraq, who controlled all previous Iraqi regimes since the departure of the British. One former minister in the interim government, Ayham al-Samarai, "launched a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the legitimate Iraqi resistance. 'The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference." ^[1]

Iraqi insurgency - Moqtada al-Sadr

Supporters of the young Shi'a Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are largely young, unemployed and often impoverished men from the Shi'a urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities.[2] The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to the Sadr City section of Baghdad in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shi'a minorities exist).

Sadr was suspected by U.S. and Iraqi authorities of ordering the assassination of a returning moderate Shiite cleric, Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, in Najaf on April 12, 2003. On April 5, 2004, a warrant was issued for Sadr's arrest in connection with this killing; this, in addition to the closing of his newspaper al-Hawza on March 29, the arrest of one of his aides, and other actions to suppress his movement led to an armed attack by the Mahdi Army in April of 2004. This initial attack in southern Iraq was suppressed by June. A second attack by his militia, centered in a mosque in Najaf, began in August; this was resolved in an agreement brokered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Since that point, Sadr's opposition to the multinational occupation was mainly in the realm of politics. Since the handover of sovereignty, the Mahdi Army has been maintained as an organized force. Sadr supporters also continue to engage in peaceful resistance such as the large protests in Baghdad on April 9, 2005.

Supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr are driven by a variety of beliefs and grievances which combine both the nationalist and ultra-conservative religious tendencies of the movement. They believe that the U.S. and U.K. are foreign occupiers and oppressors, that they have failed to live up to their promises, and that Islamic law must eventually be established in Iraq. Al-Sadr's movement also opposes any breakup of Iraq along ethnic, religious, or other lines.

During his group's active militant phase, Al-Sadr enjoyed wide support from the Iraqi people. A poll by the Iraq Center for Research and Studies found that 32% of Iraqis "strongly supported" Al-Sadr, and another 36% "somewhat supported" him, making him the second most popular man in Iraq, behind only Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Mahdi Army is believed by some sources to number between 3,000 and 10,000 guerrillas.

Iraqi insurgency - Sunni Islamists

The Sunni Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the Ikhwan movement and/or the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, who advocate a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and oppose any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member). One difference is that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards the Shi'a. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous militant Islamist movement.
Emerging as the most public face supportive of the insurgency, is the founder of the ultra-conservative Association of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari.

Iraqi insurgency - Foreign insurgents

Foreign insurgents consist mostly of Arab fighters from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are Wahabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with Iran, and may be involved. The U.S. and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi is considered the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War"), which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.

The U.S. government describes Zarqawi as the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S.-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of al-Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hard-line Wahabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shi'a and their insurgency. However, the publicity given to Zarqawi has ensured that he has become an iconic figure to various Sunni Islamist groups, regardless of the actual scope of his influence, by much the same process that has made Osama bin Laden a symbol of the causes of various Islamist groups following the events of September 11th, 2001.

The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of much controversy. Zarqawi was reported killed in action in March of 2004 in "a statement signed by a dozen alleged insurgent groups" (CBS/AP). His Jordanian family then held a funeral service on his behalf, although no body has been recovered and positively identified. Iraqi leaders have denied the presence of Zarqawi in Fallujah prior to the U.S. attack on that city in November of 2004. Zarqawi's existence has even been questioned, for example by Pepe Escobar, an antiwar op-ed writer for the Asia Times. [3]

Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being Western-centric because taken literally, the term would encompass all non-Iraqi forces, including coalition forces.^{[4] [5] [6] [7]} Zarqawi himself has taken to taunting the American occupiers about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10 May 2005^[8]). Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners." ^[9]

While it is not known how many of those resisting the U.S. occupation in Iraq are from outside the country, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a small percentage of the insurgency. Major General Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured insurgents are Iraqi.^[10] The estimate has been confirmed by the Pentagon's own figures; in one analysis of over 1,000 insurgents captured in Fallujah, only 15 were non-Iraqi. ^[11] According to the Daily Telegraph, information from military commanders engaging in battles around Ramadi exposed the fact that out of 1300 suspected insurgents arrested in five months of 2005, none were non-Iraqi, although Colonel John Gronski stated that foreigners provided money and logistical support: "The foreign fighters are staying north of the [Euphrates] river, training and advising, like the Soviets were doing in Vietnam"[12]

In addition, the presence of at least some foreign fighters has been confirmed. On September 7, 2005, an Iraqi Army Captain claimed that Iraqi forces arrested 150 non-Iraqi Arabs in Tal Afar.[13] But other accounts of the same battle do not mention these arrests[14], and U.S. Army commander Colonel HR McMasters said the "vast majority" of insurgents captured there were "Iraqis and not foreigners."[15] Iraqi journalist Nasir Ali claimed that there were "very few foreign combatants" in Tal Afar and charged "Every time the US army and the Iraqi government want to destroy a specific city, they claim it hosts Arab fighters and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."[16]

However, the majority of suicide bombings are believed to be carried out by non-Iraqi foreigners. [17] Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by foreign fighters, as well as the extreme interpretation of Islam that they attempt to impose on the local population in areas temporatily under their control, have increasingly turned Iraqis against them, in some cases breaking out into open fighting between different groups in the insurgency [18] [19] [20]. There are signs that local Islamist insurgent groups have also increasingly caused the population to turn against them [21] [22] [23] [24]

Terrorism expert Jessica Stern, however, warned that "in the run-up to the war, most Iraqis viewed the foreign volunteers who were rushing in to fight against America as troublemakers, and Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed many of them. Today, according to [Iraqi scholar] Mr. [Mustapha] Alani, these foreigners are increasingly welcomed by the public, especially in the former Baathist strongholds north of Baghdad."[25]

There are many other historical guerrilla wars in which foreign fighters played an important role (such as the Contras versus the Sandinistas). It should be noted that many of the US-backed guerrillas fighting the Soviet-backed government and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s were not Afghans -- many were Arab Islamists recruited outside Afghanistan. Foreign fighters continued to play a role in Afganistan's subsequent civil wars, many fighting on the side of the Taliban. At the time of the collapse of Taliban rule, anger against these foreign fighters was especially intense.^[26]

There are allegations that the U.S. government has attempted to inflate the number of foreign fighters in order to advance the theory that the insurgency is not a local movement. U.S. Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis spoke about his job identifying many of the bodies after the assault on Fallujah:

While some have noted an alliance of convenience that existed between the foreign fighters and the native Sunni insurgents, there are signs that the foreign militants, especially those who follow Zarqawi, are increasingly unpopular among the native insurgents. In the run-up to the December 2005 elections, Sunni insurgents are warning al Qaeda members and foreign fighters not to attack polling stations. One former Baathist told Reuters, "Sunnis should vote to make political gains. We have sent leaflets telling al Qaeda that they will face us if they attack voters." And a Sunni insurgency leader specifically commented on Zarqawi: "Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the Sunnis will keep facing occupation."[28]

Iraqi insurgency - Non-violent groups

Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed insurgency, which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans, such as the former Iyad Allawi government and the U.S.-organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament. ^[29] Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition. ^[30]

Trades unions, however, have themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgency. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgency group on the 3rd of January 2005. No trades unions support the armed insurgency.^[31]

Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the occupation and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils call for replacement of US and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition. ^[32] Many unions see the war as having two dimensions: military and economic. The GUOE has won strikes against both the Governing Council for pay raises and against Halliburton over the use of foreign workers. ^[33]

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Composition", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki