Iraq and weapons of mass destruction: Encyclopedia II - Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Aftermath of the 2003 war

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Aftermath of the 2003 war

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - BBC report sexed up in Iraqi Dossier

On May 29, 2003, Andrew Gilligan appears on the BBC's Today program early in the morning. Among the contentions he makes in his report are that the government "ordered (the September Dossier, a British Government dossier on WMD) to be sexed up, to be made more exciting, and ordered more facts to be…discovered." The broadcast is not repeated.[34]

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Wolfowitz makes a controversial statement

On May 30, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the issue of weapons of mass destruction was the point of greatest agreement among Bush's team among the reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In Vanity Fair, he said, "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason..." The remainder of the quote, which was not included in the article, is as follows, according to a Pentagon transcript: "...but, there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two." [35] The same day, General James Conway, senior Marine commander in Iraq, expressed similar thoughts in a satellite interview with reporters at the Pentagon.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - The New York Times Ahmad Chalabi and WMD

In the build up to the 2003 war the New York Times published a number of stories claiming to prove that Iraq possessed WMD. One story in particular, written by Judith Miller helped persuade the American public that Iraq had WMD: in September 2002 she wrote about an intercepted shipment of aluminum tubes which the NYT said were to be used to develop nuclear material. It is now clear that they could not be used for that purpose.

The story was followed up with television appearances by Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice all pointing to the story as part of the basis for taking military action against Iraq.

Miller's sources were introduced to her by Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile favourable to a US invasion of Iraq. Miller is also listed as a speaker for The Middle East Forum, an organization which openly declared support for an invasion.

In May 2004 the New York Times published an editorial which stated that its journalism in the build up to war had sometimes been lax. It appears that in the cases where Iraqi exiles were used for the stories about WMD were either ignorant as to the real status of Iraq's WMD or lied to journalists to achieve their own ends.

However, Judith Miller wasn't the only Times reporter detailing Iraqi WMD ambitions, and Iraqi exiles weren't the only source of information:
"Iraq Has Network of Outside Help on Arms, Experts Say", New York Times, November 20, 1998, By Barbara Crossette
"AFTER THE ATTACKS: THE OVERVIEW; U.S. Says Iraq Aided Production Of Chemical Weapons in Sudan", New York Times, August 25, 1998, by Steven Lee Myers
"Iraq Suspected of Secret Germ War Effort", New York Times, February 8, 2000, By Barbara Crossette
"Signs of Iraqi Arms Buildup Bedevil U.S. Administration", New York Times, February 1, 2000, By Steven Lee Myers
"FLIGHT TESTS SHOW IRAQ HAS RESUMED A MISSILE PROGRAM", New York Times, July 1, 2000, By Steven Lee Myers
"C.I.A. Orders Inquiry Into Charges of Chemical Arms Cover-Up", New York Times, November 2, 1996, by Philip Shenon
"Czechs Say They Warned U.S. Of Chemical Weapons in Gulf", New York Times, October 19, 1996, By Philip Shenon
"C.I.A. REPORT SAYS IT FAILED TO SHARE DATA ON IRAQ ARMS", New York Times, April 10, 1997, By Philip Shenon
"U.N. Reveals New Evidence Of Gas From 2d Iraqi Depot", New York Times, July 30, 1997, By Philip Shenon
"Expert Panel Says Pentagon Ignored Evidence of Poison Gas", New York Times, October 31, 1997, By Philip Shenon
"Clinton Says Iraq's Balking Over Weapons Will Backfire", New York Times, November 3, 1998, By Philip Shenon
"ATTACK ON IRAQ: THE STRATEGY; Strikes Aimed At Crippling Factories For Weapons", New York Times, December 17, 1998, By Philip Shenon

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Looting of nuclear facilities

Various nuclear facilities, including the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. (Gellman, 3 May 2003) On June 20, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons of uranium, as well as other radioactive materials such as thorium, had been recovered, and that the vast majority had remained on site. There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. By June 7, 2003, many American and British media sources [36] [37] began questioning the credibility of the Bush administration, and John Dean even brought up the possibility of impeachment [38] for "lying to Congress and the American people", although this idea has largely fallen by the wayside since some members of Congress had access to much of the same information as the White House. It has been suggested that the documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and burned in Iraq by looters in the final days of the war. [39]

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Nuclear scientist buried components

After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program until 1997, handed over blueprints for a nuclear centrifuge along with some actual centrifuge components, stored at his home — buried in the front yard — awaiting orders from Baghdad to proceed. He said, "I had to maintain the program to the bitter end." In his book, "The Bomb in My Garden," the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted Saddam's bombmaking program.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Iraq Survey Group

On 30 May 2003, The U.S. Department of Defense briefed the media that it was ready to formally begin the work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a fact finding mission from the coalition of the Iraq occupation into the WMD programs developed by Iraq, taking over from the British-American 75th Exploitation Task Force.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence Review

On 4 June 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced that the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence that he chaired would "as a part of its ongoing oversight of the intelligence community...conduct a Review of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction."

On 9 July 2004, the Committee released the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Blair maintains that Iraq had WMD's

On July 17, 2003, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an address to the US congress, that history would forgive the United States and United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons of mass destruction. He still maintained that "with every fiber of instinct and conviction" Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - The ISG Interim Report

On October 3, 2003, the world digests David Kay's Iraq Survey Group report that finds no stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, although it states the government intended to develop more weapons with additional capabilities. Such programs appear to have been largely dormant. Weapons inspectors in Iraq do find some "biological laboratories" of unclear purpose and a strain of botulinum bacteria which had been declared. The US-sponsored search for WMD had at this point cost $300 million and was projected to cost around $600 million more.

In David Kay's statement on the interim report of the ISG (Kay, 2003) the following paragraph is found:

"We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis."

Another notable statement is the following:

"We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002."

The phrase of 'WMD-related program activities' was later used in George Bush's state of the union speech. Bush's critics, often not realizing the origin of the statement, derided Bush for unclear wording and trying to "lower the bar" on confirming his pre-war WMD-claims.

Demetrius Perricos, then head of UNMOVIC, stated that the Kay report contained little information not already known by UNMOVIC. (Pincus, 2003) Many organizations, such as the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, have claimed that Kay's report is a "worst case analysis" [40]

On 29 October U.S. intelligence spokesmen claimed that Iraqi WMDs and programmes had been comprehensively hidden before or immediately after the fall of Bagdhad, with some elements of the programmes being shipped out of the country.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Saddam captured: Insists no WMDs

On 14 December Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. forces. Time Online Edition reports that in his first interrogation he was asked whether Iraq had any WMDs. According to an official, his reply was: "'No, of course not, the U.S. dreamed them up itself to have a reason to go to war with us.' The interrogator continued along this line, said the official, asking: 'if you had no weapons of mass destruction then why not let the U.N. inspectors into your facilities?' Saddam’s reply: 'We didn’t want them to go into the presidential areas and intrude on our privacy.'” (Bennett, 2003)

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Butler Inquiry

On 3 February 2004, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced an independent inquiry, to be chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell, to examine the reliability of British intelligence relating to alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. ("Iraq", 2004)

The Butler Review was published 14 July 2004.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Iraq Intelligence Commission

On 6 February 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush named an Iraq Intelligence Commission, chaired by Charles Robb and Laurence Silberman, to investigate United States intelligence, specifically regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction - Post-war interviews with Iraqi WMD searchers

On 8 February 2004, Dr Hans Blix, in an interview on BBC TV, accused the US and British governments of dramatising the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in order to strengthen the case for the 2003 war against the government of Saddam Hussein. Quote:

"It was to do with information management. The intention was to dramatise it." [41]

Bill Tierney, former UNSCOM inspector and Arabic linguist said: "On nukes, some analysts wait until there is unambiguous proof before stating a country has nuclear weapons. This may work in a courtroom, but intelligence is a different subject altogether. I believe it is more prudent to determine what is axiomatic given a nation’s capabilities and intentions. There was no question that Iraq had triggering mechanisms for a nuke, the question was whether they had enriched enough uranium. Given Iraq’s intensive efforts to build a nuke prior to the Gulf War, their efforts to hide uranium enrichment material from inspectors, the fact that Israel had a nuke but no Arab state could claim the same, my first-hand knowledge of the limits of UNSCOM and IAEA capabilities, and Iraqi efforts to buy yellowcake uranium abroad (Joe Wilson tea parties notwithstanding), I believe the TWELVE years between 1991 and 2003 was more than enough time to produce sufficient weapons grade uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Maybe I have more respect for the Iraqis’ capabilities than some." [42]

In an interview with BBC in June 2004 David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, made the following comment:

"Anyone out there holding — as I gather Prime Minister Blair has recently said — the prospect that, in fact, the Iraq Survey Group is going to unmask actual weapons of mass destruction, [is] really delusional."

Speaking on FOX News Sunday, David Kay said "We know there were terrorist groups in state [Iraq] still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomenon was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been dangerous if the war had not intervened." [43]

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Aftermath of the 2003 war", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki