Efficiency wages: Encyclopedia II - Efficiency wages - Sociological models

Efficiency wages - Sociological models

Efficiency wages - Fairness norms and reciprocity

Standard economic models ("neoclassical economics") assume that people pursue only their own self-interest and do not care about “social” goals. Some attention has been paid to the idea that people may be altruistic (care about the well-being of others), but it is only with the addition of reciprocity and norms of fairness that homo economicus becomes more human (eg Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 2000). Thus of crucial importance is the idea of exchange: a person who is altruistic towards another expects the other to fulfil some kind of fairness norm, be it reciprocating in kind, in some other but – according to some shared standard – equivalent way; or simply by being grateful. If the expected reciprocation is not forthcoming, the altruism is unlikely to be repeated or continued. In addition, similar norms of fairness will typically lead people into negative forms of reciprocity too – in the form of retaliation for acts perceived as vindictive. This can bind actors into vicious loops where vindictive acts are met with further vindictive acts.

In practice, despite the neat logic of standard neoclassical models, these kinds of sociological models do impinge upon very many economic relations, though in different ways and to different degrees. For example, if an employee has been exceptionally loyal, a manager may feel some obligation to treat that employee well, even when it is not in his (narrowly defined, economic) self-interest to do so. It would appear that although broader, longer-term economic benefits may result (eg through reputation, or perhaps through simplified decision-making according to fairness norms), a major factor must be that there are noneconomic benefits the manager receives, such as not having a guilty conscience (loss of self-esteem). For real-world, socialised, normal human beings (as opposed to abstracted factors of production), this is likely to be the case quite often. (As a quantitative estimate of the importance of this, Weisbrod’s 1988 estimate of the total value of voluntary labor in the US - $74 billion annually – will suffice.) Examples of the negative aspect of fairness include consumers “boycotting” firms they disapprove of by not buying products they otherwise would (and therefore settling for second-best); and employees sabotaging firms they feel hard done by.

Rabin (1993) offers three stylised facts as a starting-point on how norms affect behaviour: (a) people are prepared to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are being kind; (b) they are also prepared to do this to punish those being unkind; (c) both (a) and (b) have a greater effect on behaviour as the material cost of sacrificing (in relative rather than absolute terms) becomes smaller. Rabin supports his Fact A by Dawes and Thaler’s (1988) survey of the experimental literature, which concludes that, for most one-shot public good decisions in which the individually optimal contribution is close to 0 percent, the contribution rate ranges from 40 to 60 percent of the socially optimal level. Fact B is demonstrated by the “ultimatum game” (eg Thaler 1988), where an amount of money is split between two people, one proposing a division, the other accepting or rejecting (where rejection means both get nothing). Rationally, the proposer should offer no more than a penny, and the decider accept any offer of at least a penny, but in practice, even in one-shot settings, proposers make fair proposals, and deciders are prepared to punish unfair offers by rejecting them. Fact C is tested and partially confirmed by Gerald Leventhal and David Anderson (1970), but is also fairly intuitive. In the ultimatum game, a 90% split (regarded as unfair) is (intuitively) far more likely to be punished if the amount to be split is $1 than if it is $1 million.

A crucial point (as noted in Akerlof 1982) is that notions of fairness depend on the status quo and other reference points. Experiments (Fehr and Schmidt 2000) and surveys (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986) indicate that people have clear notions of fairness based on particular reference points (disagreements can arise in the choice of reference point). Thus for example firms who raise prices or lower wages to take advantage of increased demand or increased labour supply are frequently perceived as acting unfairly, where the same changes are deemed relatively acceptable when the firm makes them due to increased costs (Kahneman et al). In other words, in people’s intuitive “naïve accounting” (Rabin 1993), a key role is played by the idea of entitlements embodied in reference points (although as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000 point out, there may be informational problems, eg for workers in determining what the firm’s profit actually is, given tax avoidance and stock-price considerations). In particular it is perceived as unfair for actors to increase their share at the expense of others, although over time such a change may become entrenched and form a new reference point which (typically) is no longer in itself deemed unfair.

Efficiency wages - Sociological efficiency wage models

Solow (1981), drawing on these kinds of concepts, argued that wage rigidity may be at least partly due to social conventions and principles of appropriate behaviour, which are not entirely individualistic in origin. Akerlof (1982) provided the first explicitly sociological model leading to the efficiency wage hypothesis. Using a variety of evidence from sociological studies, Akerlof argues that worker effort depends on the work norms of the relevant reference group. In Akerlof’s partial gift exchange model, the firm can raise group work norms and average effort by paying workers a gift of wages in excess of the minimum required, in return for effort above the minimum required. The sociological model can explain phenomena inexplicable on neoclassical terms, such as why firms do not fire workers who turnout to be less productive; why piece rates are so little used even where quite feasible; and why firms set work standards exceeded by most workers. A possible criticism is that workers do not necessarily view high wages as gifts, but as merely fair (particularly since typically 80% or more of workers consider themselves to be in the top quarter of productivity), in which case they will not reciprocate with high effort.

Akerlof and Yellen (1990), responding to these criticisms and building on work from psychology, sociology, and personnel management, introduce “the fair wage-effort hypothesis”, which states that workers form a notion of the fair wage, and if the actual wage is lower, withdraw effort in proportion, so that, depending on the wage-effort elasticity and the costs to the firm of shirking, the fair wage may form a key part of the wage bargain. This provides an explanation of persistent evidence of consistent wage differentials across industries (eg Slichter 1950; Dickens and Katz 1986; Krueger and Summers 1988): if firms must pay high wages to some groups of workers – perhaps because they are in short supply or for other efficiency-wage reasons such as shirking – then demands for fairness will lead to a compression of the pay scale, and wages for other groups within the firm will be higher than in other industries or firms.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "Sociological models", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki