Charles de Gaulle: Encyclopedia II - Charles de Gaulle - 1962–1968 Politics of grandeur

Charles de Gaulle - 1962–1968 Politics of grandeur

With the Algerian conflict behind, de Gaulle was able to achieve his two main objectives: To reform and develop the French economy, and to promote an independent foreign policy and a strong stance of France on the international stage. This was the so-called "politics of grandeur" (politique de grandeur).

Charles de Gaulle - Thirty glorious years

In the context of a population boom unseen in France since the 18th century, the government under prime minister Georges Pompidou oversaw a rapid transformation and expansion of the French economy. With dirigisme — a unique combination of capitalism and state-directed economy — the government intervened heavily in the economy, using indicative five-year plans as its main tool. High profile projects, mostly but not always financially successful, were launched: the extension of Marseille harbor (soon becoming number three in Europe and number one in the Mediterranean); the promotion of the Caravelle passenger jetliner (a predecessor of Airbus); the decision to start building the supersonic Franco-British Concorde airliner in Toulouse; the expansion of the French auto industry with state-owned Renault at its center; and the building of the first motorways between Paris and the provinces. With these projects, the French economy recorded growth rates not accounted for since the 19th century. In 1963 de Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry into the EEC for the first of two times. In 1964, for the first time in 200 years, France's GDP overtook that of the UK, a position it held until the UK's GDP again surpassed France's in the 1990s. This period is still remembered in France with some nostalgia as the peak of the Trente Glorieuses ("Thirty Glorious Years" of economic growth between 1945-1975).

Charles de Gaulle - The fourth nuclear power

This strong economic foundation enabled de Gaulle to implement his independent foreign policy. In 1960, France became the fourth state to acquire a nuclear arsenal, having successfully detonated an atomic bomb in the Algerian desert. In 1968, at the insistence of de Gaulle, French scientists finally succeeded in detonating a hydrogen bomb, without any American assistance. In what was regarded as a snub to Britain, de Gaulle declared France was the third big independent nuclear power, as Britain's nuclear force was closely coordinated with that of the United States (though critics countered that this "independence" was an illusory luxury France could afford only by being under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella). While grandeur was surely an essential motive in these nuclear developments, another was the concern that the U.S., involved in an unpopular and costly war in Vietnam, would hesitate to intervene in Europe should the Soviet Union decide to invade. An additional effect of the development was that the French military, which was demoralised close to the point of rebellion after the loss of Algeria, was kept busy. In 1965 France launched its first satellite into orbit, being the third country in the world to build a complete delivery system, after the Soviet Union and the United States.

Charles de Gaulle - China

De Gaulle was convinced that a strong and independent France could act as a balancing force in the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, a policy seen as little more than posturing and opportunism by his critics, particularly in Britain and the U.S., to which France was formally allied. In January 1964, he officially recognized the People's Republic of China, despite US opposition. It should be noted that he was only coming to the same conclusion that would lead to the spectacular trip of U.S. President Nixon to China eight years later. Indeed, Nixon's first foreign visit after his election was to de Gaulle in 1969. They both shared the same non-Wilsonian approach to world affairs, believing in nations and their relative strengths, rather than in ideologies, international organizations, or multilateral agreements. De Gaulle is famously quoted for nicknaming the United Nations le Machin ("the thing").

Charles de Gaulle - Second round

In December 1965, de Gaulle was returned as president for a second seven-year term, but for the first time had to go through a second round of voting in which he defeated François Mitterrand. In February 1966, France withdrew from the common NATO military command, but remained within the organization. De Gaulle, haunted by the memories of 1940, wanted France to remain the master of the decisions affecting it, unlike in the 1930s, when France had to follow in step with the British ally. Again, though, the move was seen as further evidence of de Gaulle's hypocrisy; critics charged he was content for France to be protected by NATO, while publicly snubbing the alliance. In September 1966, in a famous speech in Phnom Penh (Cambodia), he expressed France's disapproval of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War; again, preceding Nixon by seven years, he called for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam as the only way to ensure peace. As the Vietnam War had its roots in French colonialism in southeast Asia, this speech did little to endear de Gaulle to the Americans, even if they later drew the same conclusion.

Charles de Gaulle - The Six Day War

Having vetoed Britain's entry into the EEC a second time, in June 1967, he condemned the Israelis over their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza following the Six Days War. This was a major change in French policy towards Israel. Until then, France had been a staunch ally of Israel, helping Israel militarily and jointly plotting the Suez Campaign in 1956. Under de Gaulle, following the independence of Algeria, France embarked on foreign policies more favorable to the Arab side, still a distinct aspect of French foreign policy today. Israel's leadership, stung by what it considered its capricious abandonment in the face of de Gaulle's desire to appease the Arabs, then turned towards the United States for military support.

Charles de Gaulle - Nigerian Civil War

During Nigeria's civil war of 1967-1970, de Gaulle's government supported the Republic of Biafra in its struggle to gain independence from Nigeria. Despite lack of official recognition, de Gaulle provided covert military assistance through France's former African colonies. The United Kingdom was in opposition to de Gaulle's stance but he viewed the political position of the Igbo in Nigeria as analogous to that of the French Québécois living in Canada.

Charles de Gaulle - Vive le Québec Libre!

In July 1967, de Gaulle visited Canada, celebrating the centennial of its existence as a nation with a World's Fair known officially as Expo '67. On July 24, during a speech made from a balcony on Montreal city hall, to a large crowd gathered below de Gaulle uttered Vive le Québec ("Long live, Quebec!) then added, Vive le Québec libre ("Long Live Free Québec").

Harshly criticized by English-speaking Canadians and the Canadian government for this unprecedented breach of diplomatic protocol, it was seen by many Canadians as an insult to the thousands of Canadian soldiers who had twice fought to free France.

De Gaulle's stance was nonetheless welcomed by a part of the Quebec population favouring that province's sovereignty. Outraged, the Government of Canada under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, a soldier who served in World War I and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, claimed that de Gaulle’s speech was "unacceptable", making it clear that de Gaulle was no longer welcome in Canada. Madame Pauline Vanier, the wife of the then Governor General and de facto Canadian head of state, pressed into de Gaulle's hand a scrap of paper bearing the simple reproach "1940," in reference to the fall of France to the Nazis and Canada's subsequent considerable role and sacrifice in liberating it.

De Gaulle, claiming that the word "unacceptable" was unacceptable, promptly cancelled the remainder of his visit, and returned to France where he was also heavily criticised by a large part of the French media.

His remarks were evidently not spontaneous. De Gaulle had been invited by Québec premier Daniel Johnson. Although a visiting head of state, he avoided the Canadian capital, Ottawa, taking a whole week to cross the Atlantic on the warship Colbert so he could arrive in Québec City instead. Before boarding the Colbert, de Gaulle told Xavier Deniau "They will hear me over there, it will make waves!" A week earlier, he confided to his son-in-law that "I will hit hard. Hell will happen, but it has to be done. It's the last occasion to repent for France's cowardice," referring to what he claimed was its "abandonment" of 60,000 French colonists to the British after France was defeated in the French and Indian War in 1760. On the trip back home, he told Bernard Dorin "What happened was a historical phenomenon that may have been previsible, but which took a shape that only the event could provide. Of course, I could, like many others, get away from it by uttering some courtesies or diplomatic sidesteps, but when one is Général de Gaulle, one does not get away with those kind of expedients. What I did, I had to do it."

Charles de Gaulle - No to Britain

In December 1967, in the name of France he again rejected British entry into the EEC. Again, his desire to build an independent Europe led him to consider that Britain, whose foreign policy was aligned with that of the US since the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, would only stall the efforts of the other EEC countries if it was allowed in. Contemporary British politicians expressed the belief that France was less interested in a united Europe than in a French-dominated Europe. One also has to note that ever since it joined the EEC, later the European Union, the United Kingdom has had significant eurosceptic leanings, with leaders such as Margaret Thatcher; in addition, the British tabloid press has frequently expressed intense scorn of the UK's European partners, making many continental Europeans doubt the interest of the UK having joined the EEC. Whatever the merits of de Gaulle's worries about British policy, his "non" was taken as a further insult to France's major liberator. The media often satirised these events in the question, 'Do French people have shorter memories than the British man?', in reference to when Britain harboured Free French, and aided its liberation.

Many have commented that the "policy of grandeur" was probably too ambitious and heavy for the shoulders of France. This policy, it is argued, was made possible by the exceptional historical figure of de Gaulle, but was not sustainable by post-imperial France in the long run. In any case, it is still remembered in France as a defining era of French modern foreign policy, and it still largely inspires French foreign policy today.

Adapted from the Wikipedia article "1962–1968 Politics of grandeur", under the G.N U Free Docmentation License. Please also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki